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Book Reviews
Defense Studies
War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is
Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century
By David Patrikarakos
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

L

ondon-based correspondent David Patrikarakos was initially
inspired to write War in 140 Characters by his reporting in eastern
Ukraine during the spring of 2014. There he saw firsthand how Twitter
was providing more up-to-date information than traditional print and
television media (2). He then studied ensuing events in Gaza between
Hamas and the Israel Defense Forces as well as the rise of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria. These situations confirmed his suspicion that
the nature of conflict was changing due to the weaponization of social
media. Hence, as the author states, “This book was formed in the
crucible of twenty-first-century-war” (255). It chronicles the rise of
what Patrikarakos terms the “Homo digitalis”—the hyperempowered
individual who is networked, globally connected, and able to use social
media (via narrative construction and deconstruction) to influence the
outcome of conflict directly in a posttruth world (9).
The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an
introduction, eleven chapters, a conclusion, notes, and an index. Each
chapter chronicles the impact of social media on a specific conflict and
discusses the profile and activities of a major figure. The first chapter
pertains to the Gaza conflict and the impact of the July–August 2014
tweets of the Palestinian teenager Farah Baker. The second and third
chapter address the Israeli side, focusing on the counternarrative
activities of Israel Defense Forces members Aliza Landes and Peter
Lerner, respectively.
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on the 2014 Facebook exploits
of the civilian Anna Sandalova to obtain supplies and other goods in
support of Ukrainian forces. The sixth chapter discusses the late-2014
social media activities of Vitaly Bespalov, a Russian troll in St. Petersburg.
The seventh chapter discusses the use of social media by Vladimir
Putin’s regime to help destabilize Ukraine and then seize Crimea.
The eighth and ninth chapters chronicle the metamorphosis of
Eliot Higgins. He was initially an obsessive World of Warcraft (massively
multiplayer online role-playing game) player who established the
Bellingcat website. Higgins became a respected and innovative opensource intelligence researcher following his involvement in tracing the
downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014 to
the Russian military (167).

New York: Basic Books,
2017
220 pages
$30.00
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The tenth chapter highlights the online recruitment of Sophie
Kasiki—born in Senegal and then living in France—by Islamic State
operatives. It also details the journey of her and her young son into, and
their subsequent life in, the Caliphate as well as their eventual escape
from Raqqa and repatriation back to France.
The eleventh chapter provides an overview of the 2012–15 activities
of Alberto Fernandez, who headed up the US State Department’s Center
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. This center produced
content directly aimed at attacking the narratives of al-Nusra and the
Islamic State.
The introduction and conclusion are well-developed with the
book’s findings squarely postmodern in their orientation: social media
is individually empowering and exploitative, offering both control and
freedom, and anti-state in nature in portraying the power of nonstate
networks over hierarchies (257–58). In this regard, Alec Ross’s quote is
very telling: “Good ideas die in hierarchies. Social media does not lend
itself to the clearance process. It fundamentally degrades the effectiveness
of diplomatic institutions” (263). Still, autocracies appear to be adapting
to this disruptive technology quicker than liberal democratic states. The
work is filled with useful information and nuanced insights into how
not to cede “social media space” to your opponents and identifies useful
open-source intelligence sites and apps such as SunCalc.net, PixiFly,
and Slack.
The book is extremely well-written and an easy, relatively quick, and
pleasurable read. The citations are adequate with a conceptual reliance
on Mary Kaldor’s book New and Old Wars (2012) and P. W. Singer and
Emerson T. Brookings’s pre-Like War article “War Goes Viral” in
the Atlantic (2016). Of these constructs, Kaldor’s view of twenty-first
century military success as being able “to avoid battle and to control
territory through political control of the population” is greatly evident
within some chapters of the work (261).
While the reviewer was initially put off by the specific major figure
treatment within each chapter (or within successive chapters), it allowed
each social media weaponization vignette—be it set in Gaza, Israel,
Ukraine, Russia, Syria, or the United States—to become more readily
digestible and contextually grounded around each character’s life story.
Since the work is now a few years old, it can be purchased at a
discounted price. It should be read in conjunction with Clint Watt’s
Messing with the Enemy (2018) and P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings’s
Like War (2018)—both of which it predates—for maximum impact
concerning the changing nature of conflict and the weaponization of
social media.
This subject matter is having an immense impact on how
contemporary warfare (and gray zone conflict) is being conducted by
authoritarian states, such as Russia and China, and radical Islamist
terrorist entities, such as Hamas and the Islamic State. Senior military
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officers and defense policymakers would be highly remiss in not
educating themselves on such an ascendant phenomenon.

Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy
Is Threatening Our Future
By Louise I. Shelley
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

D

ark Commerce builds upon decades-long research conducted by
Louise Shelley—a contemporary of Moisés Naím, author of Illicit
(2005)—and a multilingual heavy hitter in the world of transnational
organized crime scholarship. She is presently a professor at George Mason
University and the founder and director of its Terrorism, Transnational
Crime and Corruption Center established in 1998. Dr. Shelley’s earlier
works include Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism
(2014) and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective (2010). The thesis
of this new work is that “old forms of illicit trade persist, but the newest
forms of illicit trade, tied to computers and social media, operate as if
on steroids” (2).
It is much in line with perceptions earlier developed by Nils Gilman
and his colleagues in Deviant Globalization (2011) and other scholarly
works that argue the illicit economy is growing far quicker than the licit.
And it represents a means to obtain much higher levels of profit than
formal economic activities. Supporting this assertion is the modeling of
this evolution in the tables on “The Stages of Illicit Trade” and the licit
and illicit “Entrepreneurship and Trade” operations within the business
cycle (113, 121). While earlier stages of physical-based illicit trade have
not subsided, they have been augmented with computer-facilitated crime,
then solely computer-based illicit trade focused on virtual and intangible
cyber commodities—such as botnets, passwords, social media influence,
malware, data, and digital pornography. Interesting components of the
work also concern new constructs—such as dysfunctional selection as “nonevolutionary change [due to illicit activities] that results in survival of
the less fit” akin to the tuskless elephant (5)—and newer terms have
appeared due to the effects of planetary resource degradation, such as
water mafias and climate refugees (6).
The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an
introduction, eight chapters, a conclusion, notes, and an index. The
introductory chapter provides an overview of “the fundamental
transformation of illicit trade” that is now taking place. The following
three chapters provide background and processes related to illicit trade
from ancient times to 1800, 1800 to the end of the Cold War, and from
1993 to the present. Chapter 4 offers a detailed study of the exponential
growth of the rhino horn trade (between South Africa and Asia) while
chapter 5 discusses illicit trade business models.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2018
376 pages
$29.95
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Chapter 6 focuses on how illicit trade destroys people, and chapter 7
illustrates how it is killing our planet. Chapter 8 summarizes the complex
picture of illicit trade proliferation in our globalized world and concludes
with ways to counter the challenges illicit trade poses for humanity and
the planet. The book is very well researched and highlights the most
cutting-edge work produced in the field of transnational organized
crime today. It contains 100 pages of detailed endnotes and represents
a multiyear effort by Dr. Shelley, utilizing online, depository, and field
research supported by university and foundation grants.
Where the work falls short, however, is in the concluding chapter.
While vertically and horizontally integrated and unconventional
approaches are called for, the book ultimately provides what amounts
to a listing of recommendations. These items relate to legal and
regulatory policy, awareness and education, changing sociopolitical and
environmental mentalities, and some strategies to address environmental
and cyber-related illicit trade and to curb corruption. We are left with
the less-than-satisfying “Hail Mary” proclamation: “The challenges are
great and the windows of opportunity to reverse the planet’s present
tragic course are limited. Let us hope that the mundane but important
acts of ordinary citizens, combined with the extraordinary acts of the
few, help reverse the current growth trajectory of dark commerce” (250).
It is the reviewer’s opinion that far more time and effort was
placed into modeling and analyzing the rise of the new illicit economy
(primarily computer assisted and cyber based) and too little—including
any serious modeling or analytics—was spent on the so-what, backend-response component.
In summation, Dark Commerce does a first rate job of identifying the
threat of a new illicit economy as well as the historical processes and the
more recent technological drivers further fueling it. Still, the work would
have benefited from far more structure and analysis related to developing
mitigation and response strategies concerning the emergence of a new
illicit economy, rather than the fact we desperately need them. Dr. Shelley
does a commendable and vital service of providing field grade military
officers, strategists, and policy analysts with a strategic early warning
related to this new threat. Hopefully, in her next work, she will focus on
providing guidance on how to address dark commerce effectively.

Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics
of Nuclear Proliferation
By Alexander Lanoszka
Reviewed by Dr. Mark Duckenfield, Department of National Security and
Strategy, US Army War College
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press
216 pages
$49.95

A

lexander Lanoszka’s monograph, Atomic Assurance, has as its central
thesis “alliances are more effective in deterring potential nuclear
proliferation than in curbing actual cases of nuclear proliferation” [italics
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added] (9). The crucial role for an alliance is in providing a potential
proliferator with enough credible assurance for the alliance partner to
defend it adequately; as a result, the proliferating ally need not take the
path of self-help and pursue an independent nuclear deterrent.
West Germany, Japan, and South Korea are the three primary cases,
but the question arises as to how much variation there is in the dependent
variable as none of these American allies actually ended up developing
nuclear weapons. Lanoszka attempts to resolve this through tracing the
in-depth historical analysis of the steps in the proliferation decisionmaking process. Atomic Assurance is at its strongest in its discussion of
US foreign-policy making. The frustrations, stratagems, and triumphs
of US policymakers are closely tracked through the extensive use of
primary American sources from Presidential libraries, as well as an array
of State Department and National Security Council documents.
A short-coming of this approach—a common one in security
studies—is it provides an American perspective on the problem
of alliance management and nuclear proliferation. The prism for
information and interpretation is often an American one as the
primary documentation for information from abroad is that which
is communicated to the United States from its allies. Especially in as
contentious an area as nuclear proliferation, there is reason to question
whether the concerns German, South Korean, and Japanese governments
conveyed were themselves designed to extract concessions from the
United States rather than truly reflecting the strength of concerns of
the allies.
Atomic Assurance’s central argument emphasizes that security
considerations and domestic politics of the potential proliferator are the
real agency; merely imputing them from American records and (usually
American) secondary accounts thus weakens the evidentiary foundation
of the case. In fact, from the source material, it is unclear alliances
actually do prevent a potential proliferator from pursuing enhancement
of nuclear capabilities as all of the countries in the study, by its own terms,
pursued some degree of nuclear proliferation. To ascertain effectiveness,
some cases where an allied country should have had reason to pursue
nuclear proliferation but did not even start would be helpful in providing
leverage on the crucial question. Dogs that do not bark are often as
important as those that do.
There is another anomaly in the research design: Lanoszka only
examines alliances that include the United States. He does note Cold
War-era proliferation issues affected both NATO and the Soviet Bloc.
Considering there were proportionately more potential proliferators in
American-led alliances than in Soviet-dominated ones might suggest
a crucial variable is the nature of the alliance and the underpinning
relationships between its members.
As a result, it is probably no accident the three nuclear-curious
countries in the Soviet alliance were the three most independent from
the Soviet Union—China, North Korea, and Romania. Likewise, the
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96

Parameters 49(4) Winter 2019–20

lining up of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies, as well as almost all of
its Arab proxies as initial signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), indicates formal and informal arrangements can facilitate some
degree of alliance coordination.
There are also variations in the types of American-led alliances—
ranging from the multilateral alliance of NATO to the bilateral
arrangements the United States has with Japan and South Korea.
However, the definition of alliance used here is confined to written
agreements. While this is both parsimonious and provides a clear
definition, it also obscures the ebbs and flows a more flexible definition
of alliance might reveal.
At first glance, this might appear to preclude a less rigorous analysis
of cases where the rationale for variations is the writer’s assessment
of commitments implied in unwritten understandings, rather than
the hard realities of a written treaty commitment. But in process
tracing, Lanoszka makes precisely these assessments about domestic
politics and perceptions of the international threat environments and
alliance coordination.
The Warsaw Pact crushing of the Prague Spring doubtless raised
German security concerns not just about German domestic politics.
West German ratification of the NPT occurred at the same time as Italy
and the Benelux countries due to intra-European and NATO alliance
coordination, an aspect not mentioned. Atomic Assurance addresses
several of these variations in five shadow cases—Australia, France,
Great Britain, Norway, and Taiwan—ranging from one page (Australia)
to five pages (Great Britain). The brevity of the coverage of these cases
prevents a fuller assessment of the important questions they raise, but
Lanoszka is to be commended for including them as a starting point for
further inquiry.
This book makes clear contributions to discussions in both academic
and practitioner communities. It widens the field of academic discussion
by breaking free of data sets and delving into some of the dynamics and
contingent processes through which policy is made. Lanoszka avoids
concluding on a pessimistic note, emphasizing continuity of American
military and technological predominance can alleviate security concerns
among its allies if policymakers are attentive to demonstrations of
alliance commitment.
The book’s final paragraph contains a strange typographical error
referring to potential “Teutonic shifts” in the international balance
of power (158). Given the tectonic shifts in international security
accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall and the earlier tremors
emanating from Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (easing the path to ratification
of the NPT), one could choose to believe this is the author’s subtle
joke about the prospects for sudden change in the international system.
Nuclear proliferation could have just such a consequence.
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Plutocratic Insurgency Reader
Edited by Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, professor of international relations
and comparative politics, Georgia Southern University and adjunct research
professor, US Army War College

A

ccording to the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual (2007), an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at
the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion
and armed conflict” (2). Bard E. O’Neill, in his seminal work Insurgency &
Terrorism, defines an insurgency “as a struggle between a nonruling group
and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses
political resources . . . and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the
basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” (15). There are
several types of insurgencies, such as anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist,
apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist,
and commercialist.
With the publication of the Plutocratic Insurgency Reader, Robert J.
Bunker, adjunct research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, nonresident fellow in
terrorism and counterterrorism at TRENDS Research and Advisory, Abu
Dhabi, add an additional layer to an already extended list of insurgencies.
But unlike other insurgencies that attempt to overthrow legitimate
governments to establish their fiefdoms, plutocratic insurgencies depend
on the existence of the state as well its institutions for survival. As
Bunker and Bunker clearly state:

Bloomington, IN: Xlibris,
2019
376 pages
$19.99

plutocratic insurgency arises wherever you see financial and economic elites
using [their created enclaves] as staging areas for making war on public goods.
. . . the defining political-economic feature of plutocratic insurgency [is an]
attempt on the part of the rich to defund the provisioning of public goods,
in order to defang a state which they see as a threat to their prerogatives (2).

Like guerrillas fighting a war of the fleas, plutocratic insurgents do
not want to obliterate the state. They simply, like parasites, want to carve
out de facto zones of autonomy by crippling the state’s ability to constrain
their freedom of economic action (13). These zones of autonomy then
enable individual, tribal, or interest group enrichment (23).
One direct, unintended consequence of globalization is the
advancement of predatory capitalism, which plutocratic insurgents
have ingeniously integrated into their arsenal of tools to advance their
causes. Predatory capitalism is exploitive and oppressive to those below
the top one percent. Predatory capitalists use bribery, corruption,
coercion, and cooptation to maximize gains and minimize loss.
Additionally, to generate profits both nationally and transnationally,
plutocratic insurgents use lawyers and lobbyists, rather than violence
or overthrowing the state, to create a shadow governance in pursuit of
plutocratic policy objectives (219).
TOC
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Plutocratic insurgents turn the public into their own fiefdom
through privately owned public spaces (141). These so-called pseudopublic spaces are former public spaces now in the hands of corporate or
plutocratic elites, and they are governed by restrictions drawn up by the
landowner, with private security companies or gangs usually enforcing
the rules (141–42).
At this junction, it is important to emphasize a plutocratic insurgency
is not the same as a kleptocracy. While both organizations’ primary goal
is to siphon the wealth of the states, the process by which they achieve
their goals and objectives are different. As Bunker and Bunker point
out, kleptocracies use the institutions of state to loot the population,
whereas plutocracies neutralize those institutions to facilitate privatesector looting (2).
Regardless of whether we call them kleptocracies or plutocracies,
the impact of their nefarious activities on the social fabric of society
is the same. Their malfeasances destroy the social fabric of society by
creating a system of impunity. They create a judicial system that has no
authority. They create a government that lacks authority, autonomy, and
the capability to address some of the most heinous crimes in a democratic
society. Most importantly, it undermines the democratic process.
As John Sullivan states in Plutocratic Insurgency Reader, “ ‘criminal
insurgencies’ and ‘crime wars’ are altering the nature of sovereignty
and governance” (286). Furthermore, Sarah Chayes argues in her book,
Thieves of the State, “corrupt government practices contribute to severe
economic distortions, threatening financial sector stability” (186).
The end of the Cold War and the “end of history” have led to a
more interconnected and globalized world in the twenty-first century.
At the same time, the democratization of technology has created a new
environment in which previously suppressed actors can exercise greater
power via the internet in a dark, deviant globalization. When corrupt
politicians join forces with plutocratic insurgents, nation-states pay the
price because corruption threatens national and global security.
I recommend Bunker and Bunker Plutocratic Insurgency Reader to our
future military leaders at the US Army War College. The 27 readings,
ranging from September 2012 through February 2019, provide a
longitudinal view of the development of plutocratic insurgency for
learners. While the concept of plutocratic insurgency may seem “like old
wine in a new bottle,” its impact today is more pervasive than ever, and
its forms are also morphing to adapt and adjust to the changes within
the unstable international system of the post-Cold War.
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Strategic Leadership
Red Teaming: How Your Business Can Conquer
the Competition by Challenging Everything
By Bryce G. Hoffman
Reviewed by Dr. Charles D. Allen, professor of leadership and cultural studies,
US Army War College

R

ed Teaming is a book where readers can learn what business leaders
have culled from the US military experience over the past two
decades. It is an organizational “how-to” that provides tactics, techniques,
and procedures to improve decision-making and performance for leaders
and managers. As such, the process of red teaming is a component
of organizational development with the goals to achieve successful
organizational change and improved performance through the alignment
of organizational learning and knowledge management.
Bryce Hoffman is a former financial journalist who transitioned
to a career as an organization consultant and author. His first book,
American Icon (2012), is a best seller cited by senior US Army leaders
for its key takeaways about leading and managing change in a large
enterprise. In 2015, Hoffman gained the distinction of being the first
non-US government civilian to attend the Red Team Leaders Course at
the Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Through that unique experience, Hoffman learned of the origins,
challenges, and evolutions of red teaming. As a result, he embraced
the concept and wrote this book to expand upon and provide methods
for any organization to “stress-test its strategy, perfect its plans, flush
out hidden threats, identify missed opportunities, and avoid being
sandbagged by unexpected events or new competitors” (250). While the
author is ambitious in such claims, he provides a well-written presentation
of concepts, an effective narrative of their application in military and
civilian organizations, and useful caveats for leaders and managers.
The book is well-organized as it begins with a critical reflection by
the US Army and the intelligence community in the wake of the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. When strategies, plans, and operations failed to
achieve desired outcomes, it was necessary to reexamine processes and
structures, as well as individual factors of decision-making—hence, the
need for red teaming. The reader learns through historical accounts that
red teaming is not a new concept, nor is it unique to the US Army.
The author identifies the core problems red teaming addresses
when the biases of individuals are compounded in groups and within
organizations. Chapter 3 presents “the Psychology of Red Teaming”
with well-researched and established findings on individual cognition

New York: Crown Business,
2017
288 pages
$28.00
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that lead to inappropriately applied heuristics, biased judgments, and use
of logical fallacies.
The purpose of red teaming is linked to its description in Command
Red Team, US Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-16, where the command
red team is a “cross-functional organizational element comprised of
trained members that provide the commander with an independent
capability to explore fully alternatives in plans and operations and
supporting intelligence, and to enhance staff decision-making through
the simulation for critical and creative thought” (I-2).
In chapter 4, “How to Start Red Teaming,” Hoffman directs the
reader to consider key questions of the type of red-team model to use, as
well as how to staff and to support the team. The three subsequent chapters
reveal red teaming is the application of strategic thinking—specifically
creative thinking, critical thinking, and systems thinking—which are
familiar to senior-level war college graduates. New to military readers
will be the compilation of tools and techniques to frame problems, to
discern underlying assumptions, and to generate alternative perspectives.
Hoffman provides several such tools with practical applications and
examples of their use in well-known business organizations. To employ
red teaming effectively requires the understanding of organizational
culture as well as organizational climate. It also requires an appreciation
of team and group dynamics in the decision-making process.
Hoffman asserts that for a red team to be effective, it must be
accepted as providing value to the organization. Given that red teams, by
design, are not invested in derived plans, courses of action, and selected
solutions, the teams are inherently contrarian and viewed as disruptors
to organizational processes. Providing value is evident when the red
team voice is sought and listened to. While the red team interjections
and assessments may not change the organizational strategy, plan, or
solution, its engagement can clarify assumptions, generate exploration of
potential consequences, and inform contingency development. Hence,
red teaming becomes a necessary organizational capability to improve
performance of the organization and its members.
Perhaps chapter 10, “The Rules of Red Teaming,” is the most
insightful: like in American Icon, Hoffman provides caveats for leaders
with pithy taglines. Of the seven rules, “Rule 1: Don’t Be a Jerk” and
“Rule 6: You Don’t Always Have to Be Right—But You Can’t Always
Be Wrong” are useful to consider regardless of the type of team or
organization—military or civilian.
National security professionals may be more comfortable with
former senior fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations and political
scientist Micah Zenko’s treatment of the topic in Red Team (2015).
Hoffman’s work, however, is more accessible to members of the defense
community with engaging vignettes that clearly illustrate the how-tos of
red teaming for the military pragmatist. Senior defense leaders will readily
find parallel opportunities in warfighting and enterprise organizations
within our military to apply red teaming in pursuit of better strategies.
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How Militaries Learn: Human Capital, Military
Education, and Battlefield Effectiveness
By Nathan W. Toronto
Reviewed by Marc R. DeVore

F

ew questions are more preoccupying to military professionals than
why some militaries perform better than others. Certain states, such
as Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya and Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire, suffered
disaster when they fought smaller and less well-armed opponents, such
as the Libyans in Chad during the 1970s and 1980s and the Rwandans
in Zaire during the 1990s. Other states, such as Israel, performed better
in their engagements with conventional Arab militaries than a material
“bean count” would suggest.
What explains these wide variations in military performance?
Scholarship on this issue has flourished in recent years, with Kenneth
Pollack highlighting culture’s role, Caitlan Talmadge demonstrating civilmilitary relations’ impact, and Stephen Biddle advancing the adoption
of combined arms tactics as a sine qua non. Despite these works, we are
still far from attaining a holistic understanding of military performance.
Nathan Toronto’s recent book, How Militaries Learn contributes to this
ongoing endeavor.
Militaries will underperform, according to Toronto, unless their
officers have first developed the intellectual habits needed to adapt their
weaponry and training to changing battlefield conditions. Military higher
education therefore contributes powerfully to battlefield performance
by instilling in officers the requisite intellectual flexibility.
Although Toronto makes a broad-based argument for prioritizing
military education, he champions one particular form of education as
separating the world’s most efficient armed forces from all others. Socratic
teaching methods, as practiced in Western academic institutions, are the
key to success. Rote learning, by way of contrast, cannot develop the
cognitive skills officers need. Ultimately, a successful system of military
higher education system—based on Socratic teaching methods—will
develop the essential habits of institutional introspection and critical
analysis within an officer corps to prevail at war.
While Toronto advocates Socratic pedagogy in general, he specifically
champions the education of midlevel officers. Although most states
possess military academies—often organized along the lines of France’s
Saint-Cyr, the United States Military Academy, or Britain’s Sandhurst—
that educate junior officers Toronto advocates postgraduate military
education play a greater role in shaping battlefield performance. Toronto
devotes his attention to the family of institutions whose progenitor was
the Prussian War College and which includes such diverse American
bodies as the National Defense University, the Command and General
Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2018
166 pages
$90.00
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Toronto competently demonstrates his argument’s plausibly in a
variety of ways. He begins with a statistical test demonstrating that states
possessing staff colleges are more likely to win wars under ceteris paribus
conditions. He then offers brief case studies of Prussia, France, Turkey,
and Egypt. These cases show states deliberately developed staff colleges
as a means of enhancing their military power, frequently in the aftermath
of catastrophic defeats or periods of military underperformance. Staff
colleges’ emergence, moreover, often coincided with periods of economic
growth and improving human capital in society. Toronto, finally, offers a
longer study of the ongoing effort of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
to create a National Defense College.
Toronto does an admirable job at shedding light on postgraduate
military education as an important, yet neglected, factor contributing to
military power. While Toronto’s effort is notable, it nonetheless leaves
important questions unanswered. I, in particular, would have appreciated
greater clarity on the mechanisms whereby military postgraduate
education translates into battlefield outcomes and on the question of
whether the classroom environments needed to develop intellectual
flexibility in the armed forces can thrive in societies that lack a modicum
of political pluralism.
Although Toronto postulates military postgraduate education
improves battlefield performance, he never explicitly states how this
occurs. Three responses, however, could be offered—for example,
armies with better educated midrank officers may win because they
excel at the operational level of war. In a slightly different vein, the real
advantage of such armies may lie in the superior adaptability of battalion
and regimental commanders when facing unexpected circumstances.
Finally, the value of well-educated officers may manifest itself at the
strategic level, when it comes to making long-term decisions about force
structure and doctrine.
While these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, Toronto’s failure
to discuss how military postgraduate education yields battlefield results
becomes perplexing once one contemplates his case studies. France’s
poor performance during the Franco-German War, for example, was a
product of incompetence at the operational level, which the oftentimes
adroit tactical improvisations by midranking officers could not remedy.
The Egyptian case, however, suggests tactical adaptability is the
primary value of military postgraduate schools. In this case, Egyptian
generals developed an ingenious war plan prior to the Yom Kippur
War (1973) despite Egypt not possessing an adequate system of military
postgraduate education, yet midlevel Egyptian officers’ inflexibility in
changing circumstances ultimately led to defeat. Toronto, meanwhile,
suggests better peak-level defense policymaking is one of the advantages
postgraduate education provides, yet also shows how capable rulers—
Turkey’s Ataturk and Egypt’s Mohammed Ali—excelled in this regard
despite possessing a comparatively undereducated officer corps.
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Just as Toronto fails to address how military postgraduate education
produces results, he also vacillates as to whether such education systems
are compatible with states lacking political pluralism. Authoritarian
governments understandably wince at inviting officers to engage in
free-ranging Socratic debates. Toronto acknowledges this factor when
he argues “stable” civil-military relations are a prerequisite for first-rate
military education institutions. He also shows in his chapter on the UAE
how students and faculty members eschew examining certain important
regional security issues for fear of upsetting authorities. Despite these
strong suggestions that some level of pluralism is a precondition for
the institutions Toronto advocates, he at times suggests the reverse. He
suggests, for example, that regime type is irrelevant to the quality of
military postgraduate education and claims, without support, illiberal
societies, such as Russia and China, possess military postgraduate
schools on a par with the best in democratic states.
Toronto’s work, How Militaries Learn, in sum, merits a place on
the bookshelves of commanders and scholars preoccupied with
understanding military performance. The book makes an important
and original argument. While it fails, at times, to answer the questions it
poses, those lacunae should spur further debate rather than detract from
the book’s value.

Lessons in Leadership: My Life in the US
Army from World War II to Vietnam
By John R. Deane Jr.
Reviewed by Dr. George J. Woods III, COL, US Army (Ret.), professor of strategic
leadership, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army
War College

W

ith the US Army’s reinvigoration and reorganization of the
Center for the Army Profession and Leadership, the memoir
by General John R. Deane Jr., which reflects lessons in leadership from
his distinguished 36-year US Army career, could not be timelier. He
attained four-star rank having served as the deputy assistant chief of
staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition (1973–75) and as
the commander of Army Materiel Command, which was redesignated
Development and Readiness Command under his command (1975–77).
The lessons emerge through stories of the major events that shaped
his development as an officer in a variety of assignments in war and peace.
Five years after his death at the age of 94 in 2013, Deane’s memoirs were
published through the committed effort of his editor, Jack C. Mason.
While the book emphasizes events from World War II and Vietnam,
the first and final chapters capture key moments in Deane’s life before and
after those wars. The first chapter describes the influence Deane’s father,
a general officer, and his contemporaries had in the young Deane’s life
as an army brat. Deane’s early exposure to the Army lifestyle influenced
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his pursuit of admission to the United States Military Academy at West
Point and eventual Army career. Failing to meet the physical standard
for admission, Deane enlisted in the Army where he “learned more in
that year about leadership—about what men aspire to, what influences
them, what motivates them—than in any other year in [his] life” (11).
Admitted to West Point the next year and graduating with the
Class of 1942, he was commissioned as an infantry officer, serving
with the 104th Infantry Division, deployed to the European Theater
of Operations in 1944. Initially serving as the regimental intelligence
officer, he became a battalion commander within the year. The 104th
Division was commanded by the legendary Major General Terry de la
Mesa Allen—a friend of Deane’s father. Allen represented another aspect
of Deane’s professional life and development—exposure to key mentors
who provided invaluable advice and examples for Deane to follow.
Following his tour in Europe, Deane served in US Army, European
Theater of Operations where he devised a counterespionage program
to keep Soviets operating in Germany in check. He performed a
similar role to counter North Korean threats after the Korean War. His
subsequent Pentagon assignments afforded him influence in important
budget expenditures and investments in research and development. His
assignments in the Washington, DC area included service as the deputy
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and his career-culminating
assignment as the commander, Army Development and Readiness
Command at Fort Belvoir.
Military professionals can glean important themes throughout
the book that offer timeless lessons in leadership. Appropriately, Don
Snider’s 2005 The Future of the Army Profession defines four identities for
Army professionals (warrior, leader of character, member of profession,
and servant of country). Deane’s memoirs are replete with examples of
each in the stories from his assignments in World War II (1944–45)
and Vietnam (1966–67) in which he was duly recognized with several
decorations for valor.
Illustrating leader of character, Deane recounts several events
in which he displayed physical and moral courage. Deane displayed
character when making tough decisions—whether taking bold actions
to test East German resolve when the Berlin Wall was first erected or
during contentious budget debates in the Pentagon.
He demonstrated character by holding himself and others
accountable to standards—be it defending his response to a challenge
his regimental commander presented or in describing stories of General
William E. Depuy’s relief of officers in Vietnam. Similar acts of courage
occurred when he stood up to superiors and underwrote mistakes his
subordinates made while learning to become better soldiers.
As servant of the nation, Deane’s acceptance of assignments like
the deputy at the Defense Intelligence Agency or when assigned to the
Defense Communication planning Group demonstrated his willingness
to place service to the nation above his personal desires. Furthermore,
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his service highlighted instances in which he executed his duties in spite
of disagreement with policy or policymakers. The dilemmas exemplify
difficult challenges professionals face at the most senior levels of defense.
Finally, as a member and steward of the profession, Deane embraced
two critical obligations. First, he internalized the responsibilities of
stewardship as defined in the US Army’s The Army Profession “to strengthen
the Army . . . to care for the people and other resources entrusted . . .
by the American people. . . . [and] accomplish every mission ethically,
effectively, and efficiently” (2015, 6-2). Second, he mastered “expert
knowledge” (professional competence) and invested in the development
of others through mentoring, training, preparation, and holding people
accountable for achieving standards.
Deane’s service rendered throughout his career should inspire those
who currently serve, and military professionals should widely read the
lessons he offers in leadership. Using his memoir to spur discussions
among professionals would be a most fitting tribute to his work.
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he more things change, the more they remain the same in NATO.
This year NATO celebrated its 70th anniversary, a significant
accomplishment for any alliance. Despite many predictions over the years
of NATO’s imminent demise, the Alliance remains as relevant today as
it was in 1949 when the Washington Treaty was first signed. Timothy
Sayle’s new book, The Enduring Alliance, gives some of the reasons for
NATO’s continued relevance.
This well-written and thoughtful book examines the history of postWorld War II Europe and the evolution of NATO. It does so through
the lens of specific incidents that have put pressure on ties that bind the
Alliance. In each instance, NATO adapted, and members found a way
to compromise to keep the Alliance intact.
In order to understand why NATO endures, the author first examines
systemic forces. The bipolar world into which NATO was born required
the United States and its allies to confront the ideological, economic,
and security challenges posed by the Soviet Union. In the brief unipolar
moment that followed the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, contrary to
the prediction of many scholars, NATO played an important role in
ensuring stability in Europe during a time of dramatic disruption. Not
only did NATO provide an opportunity for many former Warsaw Pact
nations, and republics in the Soviet Union, to rejoin Europe, it provided
Russia with some assurance a reunited Germany would rise peacefully
within the constraints of the Alliance.
Sayle also spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of
domestic politics within the key member states. For example, Britain had
to juggle its desire for a special relationship with the United States with
its desire to join the European Economic Community. The United States
had to balance its competing global demands during the Vietnam War
with calls from Congressional leaders, such as Senator Mike Mansfield,
that Allies pick up more of the burdens of the Alliance or the United
States would bring its forces home. It also looked at struggles within
Germany to balance the need for greater nuclear reassurance with a
growing antinuclear, populist movement. Throughout NATO’s history,
national leaders had to balance these competing demands and justify its
continued relevance to an often skeptical public.
Finally, the book examines the role of key individuals in either
causing disruption in NATO or finding mechanisms to reach consensus
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and move the Alliance forward. Clearly, founding leaders played a
crucial role in standing up NATO. Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, General
Dwight Eisenhower, and Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery
were uniquely able to guide the Alliance through its initial stage of
development and provide a structure to meet its aspirations.
This mirrors the role of leaders such as French foreign minister
Robert Schuman and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer in
enabling early European efforts such as the European Coal and Steel
Community. As NATO evolved, individuals within (German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, US President George H. W. Bush) and outside of the
Alliance (President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbechev) played a
significant role in the survival of the Alliance. Activities of key individuals
inside the Alliance also caused unnecessary strains, such as US President
Jimmy Carter’s handling of the neutron bomb and French President
Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure.
The book does a nice job in looking at several key incidents that
occurred that might have resulted in the demise of the Alliance such
as the Suez Crisis; the Soviet Union’s intervention in Hungary in 1956;
France’s departure from the integrated military structure; and the fall
of the Soviet Union. While the threat of the Soviet Union (and a future
revanchist Germany) were essential to the beginning of NATO, the
author argues NATO endured for much broader reasons. Throughout
NATO’s history, the real necessity was US leadership to maintain
security and stability among member states. This was not only for the
benefit of US Allies, but also for promoting vital US interests.
Paradoxically, in order to avoid war and the threat of war, alliances
have to be ready and willing to fight. Yet an equally important role for
NATO is maintaining the political unity of the Allies, for together, the
Allies are much more resilient against external threats and a sometimes
fickle electorate. NATO enabled the reconstruction of European
economies and provided the security umbrella under which Europeans
could pursue an ever-closer union. NATO endures because it enables
collective action to demonstrate strength against threats like Russia (and
perhaps China), to allow Germany to continue to take its rightful place
within Europe without invoking fears of its history, and to keep the
United States engaged in a region vital to US interests.
This book will be of interest to international relations scholars,
Europe enthusiasts, and those interested in Alliance dynamics. Foreign
policy practitioners will also find relevant historical analogies as the
Alliance routinely dealt with issues such as burden sharing, the role
of larger members, and the very purpose of the Alliance itself. It
also highlights the difficulties in justifying continued investments in
NATO to a domestic audience that is increasingly untouched by the
horrors of the World Wars of the twentieth century. The book is well
researched and clearly written. It is a quick but substantive read, delving
into sufficient detail to explain the nuances of each phase of NATO’s
evolution. The overarching takeaway is NATO endures because it serves
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members’ interests. Members gain greater influence and stability within
the Alliance than would be possible without it.

Peacemakers: American Leadership and
the End of Genocide in the Balkans
By James W. Pardew
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books including Blameless? The 1990s and the US Army’s Role in Creating the
Forever-Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (forthcoming)
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of Kentucky, 2018
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mbassador James W. Pardew, a former military officer, had a frontrow seat for the American military and diplomatic interventions
in the Balkans from 1995 to 2008. He served as a high-level member
of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s negotiating team in 1995. After
the beginning of the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Pardew led the US training and equipping effort. As a
special representative, he led the international effort to record Serbian
atrocities in Kosovo. Pardew also served as the US special envoy to
Macedonia during tense negotiations to avert a civil war in 2001 and as
the US ambassador to Bulgaria from 2002 to 2005.
In this memoir, Pardew makes the case “American leadership of
the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia ended the most
destructive set of regional conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Europe
since World War II” (xiii). Peacemakers opens with the US intervention
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). The book then provides a detailed
account of the US-led effort to overcome Serbian opposition to—and
US military reluctance toward—training, equipping, and unifying a joint
Croat-Muslim army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pardew also recounts
the NATO intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999,
focusing much more on events prompting the air war and negotiations
ending the bombing than the subsequent US-led peacekeeping mission.
This book truly shines in its account of the little-known crisis in
Macedonia and US-led negotiations narrowly averting a civil war there
in mid-2001. The dispute, primarily between ethnic Albanians and Slavs
in Macedonia, went largely unreported in the United States for a number
of reasons. First, by 2001, the American public had grown weary of
ethnosectarian conflict in the Balkans. Second, the new administration
of President George W. Bush came to power with promises of an end
to nation building; they were understandably reluctant to publicize
the possibility of a new nation-building mission in Macedonia. And,
only weeks after the signing of the agreement ending the conflict in
Macedonia, the events of September 11, 2001, turned the world’s
attention away from the Balkans to the Middle East and central Asia. In
Peacemakers, Pardew provides a long overdue examination of the events
and players pulling Macedonia back from the brink of war.
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As a firsthand account and primary source material for historians
of US policy in the Balkans, this book is without equal. Despite his
closeness to the subject matter, Pardew provides objectivity lacking in
other works such as Holbrooke’s To End a War (1998) or Christopher
R. Hill’s Outpost (2015). At the same time, Pardew’s closeness to the
events put the reader in the plane with Holbrooke and his team as they
discuss strategy and in the room during US negotiations with Slobodan
Milosevic and his cronies who were simultaneously committing genocide
and denying their involvement.
The military officer or defense policy professional reading
Peacemakers will be confronted with a number of uncomfortable truths.
Pardew recounts the repeated efforts of senior US military leaders to
block US military intervention in the Balkans. This book also details
the obstruction by US military leaders in Washington and in the field
against the effort to arm and to train the nascent Bosnian army after the
intervention began. Pardew does pull a few punches. He fails to note the
US military’s willful refusal to hunt down and to capture indicted war
criminals in Bosnia. And he stops just short of blaming the US Army’s
misguided post-Cold War focus on high-intensity conflict for causing its
incompetence in dealing with the low-intensity conflicts in the Balkans.
But Pardew’s honest appraisal of the US military’s obstructionism
throughout this period will still hit military professionals painfully close
to home.
Peacemakers, colored by Pardew’s role in these events from within
the US government, is not completely clear-eyed. It suffers from many
of the same maladies besetting US intervention policy then and now.
The author shares the delusional beliefs of the US diplomatic corps in
turning failed states into multiethnic, multicultural democracies and of
the State Department’s insistence on preserving borders drawn by aged
imperialists a century ago.
Moreover, Pardew accepts without question the US insistence on
appearing neutral toward all parties and refusing to pick a winner in
the conflict. Like the US government at the time, Pardew’s criteria for
judging the success of America’s intervention in the Balkans includes
single-digit US military casualties and an end to ethnosectarian violence
rather than the creation of a political solution facilitating the departure
of international peacekeepers. Peacemakers is silent on the international
military peacekeeping mission in Bosnia—currently under the auspices
of the European Union—continuing to this day with no end in sight.
These criticisms aside, Peacemakers is an essential book for anyone
wishing to understand the history of international interventions in the
Balkans. And as the American foreign policy establishment struggles
with how to end ethnosectarian civil wars in Syria and Yemen, this book
deserves close examination.
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ust hours after the Germans left Paris, Charles de Gaulle made a
triumphant march down the Champs-Élysées to the Notre-Dame
Cathedral, a symbol of conservative, eternal France. Soon thereafter, he
gave an impromptu speech from a balcony on the Hôtel de Ville—a
symbol of left-leaning France. In doing so, he sent a message not just to
the French people, who had not yet decided upon him as their postwar
leader, but also to the Americans, who had not yet ruled out a military
occupation of France.
Suspicious of lingering collaborationist sentiment and worried
about powerful communist elements in the big cities, the Americans
had prepared a full occupation, including a military scrip. De Gaulle’s
coup de main and the enthusiasm with which the French people (left,
right, and center alike) received him, rendered those plans useless. But
the US Army remained in France in large numbers, and the two sides
would need to figure out a way to coexist to pursue the common interest
of defeating Germany.
In this highly detailed book, Robert Fuller studies the FrancoAmerican relationship on the ground in France. His chapters analyze
topics like requisitions, transportation, the use of ports (especially
Marseille, the second most important Allied port in Europe behind only
Antwerp), refugees, German prisoners of war, black markets, and the
occasionally ill-disciplined American soldier. There is more detail than
argument in this book. Fuller’s main theme is the largely uncontroversial
one that the Americans and the French had points of friction, but they
usually managed to work their difficulties out eventually. Both countries
saw the need for France to continue to sacrifice in order to bring about
Germany’s defeat.
Fuller gives short shrift to how devastated France was in 1944–46.
The defeat in 1940 had not only wounded French pride but also led to an
armistice that forced France to pay an enormous sum for its occupation
and accept a franc-to-mark exchange very much to Germany’s advantage.
By 1942, a mandatory labor scheme sent thousands of young French
men and women to Germany to work in factories, and the Germans
seized most French railroad stock.
Especially after June 1944, the Germans treated France as a larder,
taking all the food it possibly could and shipping it back to Germany.
American soldiers were shocked at how thin French men and women
looked, and General Omar Nelson Bradley finally decided to authorize
the dispatch of armed forces to Paris, in large part because he had reports
the city was on the brink of famine.
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Fuller also pays too little attention to the damage done to France
by the Allies. American and British bombers devastated the French
transportation network to secure the Normandy bridgehead from
German reinforcements. They also targeted Paris, the single most
important rail center in the country. Air raids over the La Chapelle
district killed hundreds and gave the collaborationist leader Philippe
Pétain a chance to argue France was the innocent victim of a war
between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans.
Allied logistical problems after the Normandy landings created
further tensions. Needing to move forward, but short of almost
everything, the Allies quite naturally began to requisition food and
supplies from the people they were liberating.
The Americans wanted supplies to fight the Germans, and the
French wanted to return to normal life as quickly as possible. This
conflict of interest put France and the United States in competition for
the same finite set of resources. A lack of a common language, the small
number of Americans who broke the law or took more liberties than
they should have, and heavy-handed American policy exacerbated the
problems. These problems created tensions, but Fuller argues they never
got out of control or caused the US Army significant problems.
For all their differences, the two sides did share an important
common goal—winning the war. Lower-level French and American
officials, Fuller argues, worked hard to solve problems and find solutions.
American civil affairs officers, mostly majors, found themselves in
control of towns. They normally found ways to work with mayors, using
American resources to repair water lines, rebuild bridges, and help
stamp out crime. These acts built goodwill, but the French still looked
forward to the moment when the Americans would move on, letting
them rebuild their lives for themselves.
Although The Struggle for Cooperation does not present any new or
startling findings, it sheds light on an important, and often overlooked,
segment of America’s involvement in the Second World War. The images
of joyous French men and women celebrating their freedom masked the
real problems of daily life in the wake of war. Unsure what they would
find in France and anxious to keep fighting the Germans, American
officers had to improvise. Fuller shows us how they did so, usually with
success, in an incredibly difficult environment. Today’s civil affairs
officers would do well to learn from this period of American history.
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t the risk of sycophancy, the core of Learning War: The Evolution of
Fighting Doctrine in the US Navy is a book which this reviewer once
wanted to write. During the Solomon Islands campaign in 1942 and 1943,
the US Navy perfected its tactics, methods which allowed it to defeat the
highly skilled Imperial Japanese Navy. For author Trent Hone, this result
was not the product of happenstance. Instead, the American Pacific War
victory had its genesis in the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who
viewed naval strategy as a knowledge-based discipline, explained by a
set of common practices, a tactical doctrine, bred over the next two
generations. The Naval War College incubated the development of these
ideas, concepts tested by the fleet, all managed by a series of senior leaders
who saw the service needing a naval “combined-arms approach” (1).
Hone uses doctrine as a source to explain how and what the
Navy learned. The book studies the service’s “enabling constraints,”
which shaped its internal language and assumptions, making learning
possible (4). To create flexible tactics, the fleet experimented in a
“safe to fail” environment encouraging officers’ aggressiveness and
adaptability, which became and remained their common intellectual
frame (9). Learning paid off during the Navy’s wartime battles, whose
success Hone measures not by comparing ship losses for the sides in
each action, but by asking whether they met operational or strategic
goals. Aggressiveness and adaptability, acting as “heuristics” to permit
independent solutions, allowed the remaining fleet after Pearl Harbor to
recover, seize the initiative and win, admittedly at high cost: more than
5,000 sailors died off Guadalcanal, including two admirals (207).
As a management consultant, Trent Hone writes history as a sideline,
yet everything here is of professional quality. This book follows on the
heels of his previous essays and coauthored book, Battle Line (2006). His
sources, rooted in Navy officers’ published writings and exercise reports
between 1898 and 1941, battle experience between 1942 and 1944, and
vitally tactical publications, are complete. What Hone explores through
them is the evolution of tactics in the US Navy’s surface force and the
extension of combat doctrine to include the aircraft carrier portion of
the service later in World War II. At its roots, Hone convincingly argues
the US Navy created a “complex adaptive system” to collect evidence
from exercises and battles, assess it, posit solutions, distribute them to
the fleet, and then repeat the process.
The Navy’s core problem was its confrontation with rapid, continual
change. Both before and after 1915, when naval officer Dudley Knox
highlighted the military use of doctrine, the Navy integrated ever more
TOC

Book Reviews: Military History

113

tactical complexity. Gunnery exercise ranges lengthened threefold
just before World War I, then doubled in the next decade. Despite the
increasing distance challenge, artillery accuracy continually improved
under the enabling constraint of fire control taught by William Sims. The
Navy later added a linguistic shorthand for clearer correction of fire (63,
83). Torpedo tactics evolved as their ranges lengthened, too. As aviation
technically matured, initially for gunnery spotting then for strikes,
the Fleet Problems (21 large interwar exercises) allowed experiments
with it. Solving these problems reliably in peacetime meant, despite the
ruin at Pearl Harbor, the fleet took into stride the technology of radar,
while using the Combat Information Center and signals intelligence
respectively to manage and to improve its learning. The system defeated
the Imperial Japanese Navy, fighting on its preferred terms at night.
The human side gets its due here. The leading figure for Hone
is the oft maligned, admittedly mercurial, Ernest King. Service in
destroyers—as aide to Sims, a submariner, and a pilot (earning his wings
at age 48)—before becoming chief of naval operations in 1942, King was
arguably the best example of the Navy’s increased emphasis on learning
and education” who led his peers and subordinates (326). Other leaders,
only slightly less accomplished (Chester Nimitz, Raymond Spruance,
Marc Mitscher, Frank Fletcher, “Ching” Lee, and Arleigh Burke), ably
filled roles in wardrooms, and as ship, squadron, task force, and theater
commanders using the learning system. Plainly put, the Navy taught
officers how to solve problems. Only the Navy’s massive wartime
growth, requiring greater standardization for its enormous reservist
officer corps, trimmed the complex adaptive system, making late war
changes more incremental in nature (316).
Some of Learning War’s initial tables are disconnected from its
text; later ones become crucial (26, 86). The US Navy’s submarines are
largely absent. Fleet boats were meant to scout and support the battle
line, although history instead saw them conduct commerce warfare. But
submarine doctrine, focusing on what we now term the high-end fight,
needed reworking after the war’s start, another example of adaptability.
The Atlantic theater, where anti-submarine warfare also had a learning
curve, is not examined. Nor are the Navy’s torpedo problems analyzed.
For submarines and surface ships, torpedoes often failed: two destroyers
shot over a dozen Mark XV weapons to scuttle the USS Hornet in October
1942, but most misfired. Knowing fallibility of torpedoes undoubtedly
forced officers to emphasize gunfire during ensuing night battles.
Since 1996, a touchstone book for historians and naval officers of a
peacetime fleet failing to learn has been Andrew Gordon’s The Rules of
the Game (1996), studying the Royal Navy before the Battle of Jutland.
Learning War is so clear, and makes the case for American doctrinal
flexibility so well, this reviewer must argue we now have another book
of equal importance to comprehend. Daring to sound glib, before the
US Navy outfought the Imperial Japanese Navy, it had outthought it.
Members of any armed service will gain from studying Learning War, and
will recognize the Navy’s success when they read this book.
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